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ABSTRACT
Currently Latin America experiences a phenomenon of widely varying levels of violence across
the region. Many countries, such as El Salvador and Honduras, have exceptionally high murder
rates upwards of 40 homicides per 100,000 people (UNODC 2015). Other countries, such as
Uruguay and Argentina, have relatively low rates, below 10 homicides per 100,000 people
(UNODC 2015). I believe this variation stems from the use of pro-government militias specifically
employed in the past by military governments as tools of suppression. Under the guise of
combating subversive elements within their countries, these groups were used to silence and
repress those who opposed the military governments. Employing civilians, active military, police
officers and high-ranking government officials; these groups often carried clandestine and
sometimes public ties to their governments. By examining the origins, afterlives, and level of
control exerted over these pro-government militias in Argentina and El Salvador; this study aims
to understand the role these groups played in the dispersion of violence throughout society
ultimately accounting for the variation we see today.

Keywords: Pro-Government Militia, Argentina, El Salvador, Latin America, Military Government,
Dirty War
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INTRODUCTION
Currently Latin America experiences a phenomenon of widely varying levels of violence across
the region. Many countries, such as El Salvador and Honduras, have exceptionally high murder
rates upwards of 40 homicides per 100,000 people (UNODC 2015). Other countries, such as
Uruguay and Argentina, have relatively low rates, below 10 homicides per 100,000 people
(UNODC 2015). This wide variation in violence levels across Latin America is the key puzzle
behind my research question. My research question is: Does the use of pro-government militias by
military regimes affect the level of violence after the regime democratizes/falls? Based on existing
research and institutions I believe that these variables positively correlate. That the countries who
have greater control over their pro-government militias will experience less violence than that of
countries who have less control of their pro-government militias. In recent literature, new theories
are being explored about the interaction between governments and pro-government militias. These
new theories accompanied by new databases compiling countries histories with these groups is
being used to explain the relationships that governments have with these militias, why they use
them, cooperate with them, and what benefits and detriments they may have on these states. The
literature on pro-government militias is now being examined outside of civil wars and genocide
because recent data has shown that between 1982 and 2007, in over 60 countries governments
were linked to and cooperated with informal armed groups within their own borders (Carey et al.
2013). Included in the new data are many countries within Latin America. By looking closer at
specific countries within Latin America and the actions of the governments and pro-government
militias, I hope to find that the level of control that countries had over these groups can provide an
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explanation to these militias’ actions during the governments time in power and after the
government dissolved. I define control as the financial or political power used to influence
behavior. I believe that that military regimes levels of control over these pro-government militias
will influence the violence we see today because these groups are often comprised of members
within the formal security apparatus of the government such as military and police personnel. After
these governments transition many of these members disperse throughout society and this dispersal
is affected by how many sources of control there were. With more sources of control, members of
these militias will obtain similar post-regime employment elsewhere through loyalties to other
sources other than the governments; leading to varied post-regime fates and consequently more
violence.
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BACKGROUND
Pro-government militias are armed groups that are linked to government but exist outside the
regular security apparatus such as the states military or police force and have some level of
organization (Carey et al. 2013). It is understood that governments around the world collaborate
with irregular security forces such as militias, death squads, and paramilitaries. They have been
found to either create these groups, align with them, or support them even when they are not fully
under their control to achieve political goals and address security concerns. This term also
encompasses other groups as well, such as groups that are considered state-sponsored proxy forces,
death squads, vigilantes, paramilitaries, and civil defense forces. It’s found that although Progovernment militias are used in a way that increases effectiveness and legitimacy of
counterinsurgency campaigns (Carey and Mitchell 2017), they also negatively impact the fragility
of the state and welfare of the citizens (Carey and Mitchell 2017). Although it is established that
not having a monopoly on the use of violence carries multiple risks, many governments
deliberately forego a monopoly. Governments may instead choose to create groups for plausible
deniability in human rights abuses, to protect civilians against rebel groups, attack opponents or
critics of a regime, to achieve electoral gains, or even to protect the regime from a coup d’état
(Carey and Mitchell 2016). These pro-government militias are not limited to being found in
developing states but have been found in all regimes and are persistent in continuing their existence
and spread. This persistence has raised questions about government’s incentives to align with them
instead of actively opposing them and making them disappear as the state evolves (Carey and
Mitchell 2017).
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WHY PRO-GOVERNMENT M ILITIAS?
Considering this persistence, the dynamic of a government’s monopoly on violence has shifted to
a system closer resembling violence management (Staniland 2012). All governments, even with
professional militaries and a formal security apparatus, are found to tolerate at some level or even
actively create networks of armed actors, specifically pro-government militias. These groups can
be found in countries across the world both developing and long established (Carey and Mitchell
2017). In examining why governments create or support these groups, a few incentives are
rationalized as explanations for why governments use these groups. These incentives include the
need for cheap additional forces, access to local intelligence, and deniability for violence.
Governments may use these groups as additional forces, not because a group can contribute
offensively but rather it may be cheaper than fighting the group. In addition, recruited groups may
have advantages at navigating difficult terrain if they are local and can aid in projecting the
governments force (Carey et al. 2011). Most often, these groups are used to increase a
government’s legitimacy or decrease a governments accountability for violence. When security
tasks are delegated to these groups the political cost of conflict is lowered while simultaneously
providing the government with less accountability for losses incurred by the conflict (Carey et al.
2011). These incentives allow governments to justify the potential risks to civilians and the state
because of the expected benefits they will receive from these groups while minimizing their own
accountability.
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PGMS LINK TO GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY
Pro-government militias vary in proximity and affiliation with their government, all have different
characteristics and can vary in purpose, organization, and membership. To avoid using labels such
as civil defense forces, vigilantes, or paramilitaries which vary regionally and culturally (Campbell
and Brenner 2002), a typology has been created for these groups to use for comparison. This new
typology focuses on the attributes of the group rather than the context in which they exist. One
attribute is the groups link to the government and the other is the groups link to society. It is these
attributes that influence the control of these groups which is the main problem behind
monopolizing violence (Carey and Mitchell 2017). When countries lose control of these groups it
begins to challenge the legitimacy of the state itself.
The link to the government can either be semiofficial or informal (Carey et al. 2013).
Semiofficial pro-government militias can be characterized by the government establishing the
group by law and with members perhaps receiving regular compensation. They are often labeled
paramilitary forces, auxiliary forces, and state-legitimate vigilantes and even can come to include
militarized police (De Bruin 2015; Dowdle 2007). Examples include Colombia, where
Paramilitary Self Defense Forces were sanctioned under a law aimed at fighting left-wing
guerillas; and Guatemala where Civil Defense Patrols were formed by decree of the government
(Schneider 2000). Informal militias are characterized by having no formal link with the
government. Even if a link is widely known by the population, it is denied. They are generally
clandestine, and the group’s leader can report to or be a member of the government, the group may
receive weapons from the government or might carry out joint operations with normal forces
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(Carey and Mitchell 2017). They are often labeled as death squads, paramilitaries, proxy militias,
or surrogates if they are on the governments side (Campbell and Brenner 2002; Alvarez 2006).
Examples include.in Argentina where the “Working Group” death squad operated clandestinely
under military rule disappearing over 9000 people thought to be against the regime (Schneider
2000).
The link to society is defined by whether the groups are locally recruited and locally active.
Local PGMs which can be formed on a neighborhood or community basis may be subject to certain
social or economic account mechanisms that non-local PGMs may not be. This link directly affects
the groups behavior towards civilians. A key claim is that locally based militias with links to the
locality where they are operating, tend to limit indiscriminate violence and should present fewer
control problems (Carey and Mitchell 2017). These groups generally exist under the label of civil
defense forces and can either be formally recognized by the government, making them semiofficial, or develop from grassroot movements and maintain looser links with the state as an
informal pro-government militia.
The reason both the link to society and government are important for control purposes is
they affect the group’s possible goal variance and the ability of these groups to be monitored.
Groups with ties to a local community and a semiofficial link to the government ease the
monitoring and punishment process and are less likely to pursue personal goals and exhibit
opportunism (Carey and Mitchell 2017). Likewise, informal groups with non-local ties are difficult
to monitor and more likely to pursue goals that possibly conflict with the government’s objectives.
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Below is the typology outlined by Carey and Mitchell (2017) along with their expectations of the
risks these groups pose to the state and civilians.
T ABLE 1
PGM Risk to Society based on Governmental and Societal Links

Link to society

Link to government
Informal

Semi-Official

Medium

Low

Very High

Medium

Local
Risk to State and Civilians

Nonlocal
Risk to State and Civilians

PRO-GOVERNMENT M ILITIAS AND CONTROL
When discussing control of pro-government militias, a key claim is that they are linked to state
failure with it being difficult to pinpoint sometimes who is controlling who. Control depends on
goal variance, and the balance of information between the government and the militia. Militias
with private agendas and with an information advantage that are at odds with the government are
difficult to control (Miller 2005). Its suggested that a more formal link with the government lessens
goal variance, increases transparency, decreases the information gap, and creates a degree of
accountability (Carey and Mitchell 2017). When formalized, the groups are less likely to attract
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extremists and opportunists. This may be because of the established punishment mechanisms,
formal hierarchal structure and consequently lack of opportunity to pursue personal goals. In
addition, recruits that join are provided compensation leading them to place higher value on their
position. The groups that are more loosely connected, not created by the government, and that
operate at a distance from government are found more likely to have control problems and private
goals. Weak control can come from giving discretion to the informal groups or from government
weakness in states that are failing. The literature suggests that pro-government militias can be both
contributors to and a consequence of state failure (Carey and Mitchell 2017). The government’s
failure to provide security motivates the creation of militias. When control is lost over these militias
it is difficult to demobilize them. These groups can fill a security vacuum as an informal security
apparatus and gain backing from political opponents but will usually challenge the authority of the
state and put citizens at risk. While informal militias are related to state failure, semiofficial militias
are not because of their bureaucratic and financial costs which many failed states cannot incur.
Paramilitary and other semi-official organizations only exist when government allocates a
significant amount of resources to security (Dowdle 2007). Governments risk of betrayal is lower
with semiofficial militias because they are more easily monitored and high goal variance is less
likely.
ORIGINS OF PRO-GOVERNMENT M ILITIAS
Now evaluating the typology of the pro-government militias link to society, the origins of the
groups provide implications for the control and predatory nature of the group. Regardless of link
to the government, local pro-government militias might be subject to informal social and economic
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accountability mechanisms (Clayton and Thompson 2017). This can shape their behavior towards
civilians. Locally based militias that have links to the communities they are stationed in tend to
limit indiscriminate and predatory violence. Locally based militias have a higher capacity at
identifying insurgents which reduces the level of violence against civilians (Clayton and
Thompson 2017). There are two types of membership characteristics for pro-government militias:
civilians and non-civilian. The civilian memberships may take the form of ethnic/ religious links,
political or ideological links, and nationalist links to society. The non-civilian links include offduty police or military personnel, former members of the regular security apparatus, as well as
mercenaries (Carey and Mitchell 2017). Non-civilian militias tend to be small, clandestine, and
very violent. Most militias in the non-civilian societal link have an informal link with the
government as to provide deniability for their violence (Campbell and Brenner 2002).
PRO-GOVERNMENT M ILITIAS BEHAVIOR
The link with the government shapes the militias behavior towards civilians. When the government
delegates security tasks to nonstate organizations, they yield control and lessen accountability
(Carey and Mitchell 2017). Two levels of delegation are identified that increase the danger of
opportunistic behavior harmful to civilians. The first is the agency level of delegation that occurs
between organizations, this delegation occurs from the state to pro-government militias. The
second is the internal or agent level of delegation, this occurs from leader to individual agent and
occurs within organizations. At the agency level, government has the most control because of the
formal chain of command that flows from government to militia. At the internal level the principalagent problem occurs where individual agents can take actions on behalf of the leaders within the
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militia (Carey and Mitchell 2017). At this point it is difficult to pinpoint control problems because
it may be the principal ordering or condoning strategic violence against civilians that is carried out
by the agent. When the government delegates to the militias, control decreases as the amount of
daylight between the government and agency increases (Fiorina 1985). In other words, the greater
the separation between the government and the militia, the less control there is. With informal progovernment militias, the amount of daylight is greater and can expect a higher risk for civilians.
At the internal level, individual members may or may not be well controlled by superiors. Informal
militias are more likely to commit violations because of lax recruitment procedures, and less
predictable training and discipline (Carey and Mitchell 2017). This is not to say that semiofficial
militias do not commit violations, they do as well. A key hypothesis is that the more loosely
connected a group is to the state, the more likely it is that pro-government militias members use
violence for their own benefit such as looting or settling private disputes.
In addition, a key claim in the literature of pro-government militias, is that they provide
deniability. This correlates with the varying levels of control because the degree of control
influences the ease with which governments can deny responsibility for the violent acts these
groups commit. The nature of the multigovernmental link shapes the principal-agent relationship
such that government either can’t or won’t control the groups. Its outlined that informal progovernment militias make government sponsored killings, tortures, and disappearances more
likely whereas semiofficial ones do not (Mitchell et al 2014). The plausible deniability that
informal militias offer, along with the type of personnel often found in those groups produces
“violence without limits” (Alvarez 2006). This raises the question of when governments would
employ informal militias. It’s found that governments are most likely to have informal links with
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armed groups if their country is distant from democracies but dependent on their aid (Carey et.al
2015). Usually in these cases along with external democratization is occurring, leaders will
distance themselves from the repressive violence by using informal militias against the opposition.
OPEN QUESTIONS IN PGM LITERATURE
There are several questions still posed by the militia-societal link such as how ideology, politics,
and religion shape the behavior of these militias? Whether membership characteristics of these
groups are important in the relationship and risk to the government, the longevity of the groups,
and to the nature of their afterlife? (Carey and Mitchell 2017). Militias based on in-group and outgroup dynamics are likely to be more violent towards civilians, this includes groups based on
religion, ethnicity, and ideology. Non-civilian militias are predisposed to violence because their
members are likely to be skilled in extreme forms of violence (Campbell and Brenner 2002).
Membership characteristics influence the probable risk to the state. Pro-government militias with
low membership potential such as local or non-civilian groups can’t recruit large parts of society
such as the civilian groups and pose less risk to the stability of the state. In addition, the bond
between members in these groups affects the risk they pose to the state. This is because instead of
being loyal to a specific institution, loyalties lie to leaders and their goals (Carey and Mitchell
2017). This puzzling association with society is believed to help in the explanation of the survival
of these militias even after governments dissipate. My research would address how membership
plays a role on the risk to the state in military regimes, specifically how membership characteristics
affect post-regime violence. These membership characteristics also contribute to the literature on
the membership potential of these groups as I examine the actual constitutions of these groups and
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where the personnel primarily come from. Examining these variables within a military regime
allows new insights into these questions and will help further the discussion in the role that
membership plays in the control that governments exert on these groups and how that subsequently
affects violence after the regime falls.
Regarding the militias link to the government, the most significant questions that arise are;
are militias causes or consequences of state failure? Are militias linked to higher levels of
predatory violence? The literature posits that examining predatory violence requires that more
reliable actor-linked information be generated in order to assess the real risk of militia violence.
Research shows militias both fill the security apparatus vacuum and undermine the state’s ability
to provide security to its citizens (Carey and Mitchell 2017). One is work on the likelihood of
betrayal by these militias, and another is how states recover the monopoly of violence from them.
The research so far contributes little understanding to why the link between these militias and the
state breaks and when that happens what exactly happens to these groups. New data shows
semblances of side-switching by these groups, whether it be rebels defecting to the government or
why pro-government militias turn on the state (Otto et al. 2015). In either case the switches mostly
seem to be economically motivated on all sides including the government (Oppenheim et al. 2015).
The entire government-militia link and control issue raise questions about the effectiveness of progovernment militias. Future research may explore institutions holding governments and militia
members accountable for war crimes and human rights violations and whether informal or
semiofficial status makes a difference (Carey and Mitchell 2017). There are multiple factors
influencing their effectiveness as well as wrongdoing. They depend on the members that are
attracted to the group, the types of motivations they have and the social and political institutions
12

in which they develop. My research will be delving into the literature on the constitutions, controls,
and punishments these groups received and how the control held over them by the government
affected these variables. In examining these behaviors my research will further the discussion on
the predatory nature of these groups, their membership characteristics, what happens to these
groups after their link to the state breaks and how this affects the variations in violence, we see
today.
In addition to the militia’s attributes of government and societal link, there is an alternative
literature that distinguishes additional attributes that have implications for these groups’ survival
and behavior. One attribute is whether the group is initiated from the ground up, and the other is
the context in which the groups are active. Another notable distinction is that between stateorchestrated and community-driven groups. These alternative attributes somewhat overlap with
the typology of semi-official and informal militias (Carey and Mitchell 2017). In examining the
pro-government militias used by military regimes, I analyze the origins of these groups including
whether they were state orchestrated or driven by community factors; contributing how these
factors affect the levels of violence during their use by military governments.
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THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE ON PRO-GOVERNMENT MILITIAS
The main research questions this paper will be addressing is whether the level of control that a
government has over its pro-government militias affects the level of violence by these progovernment militias after the government dissipates. My research would utilize the typology of
informal and semi-official militias, and the alternative of community driven groups and stateorchestrated ones. It will examine whether the informal or semi-official status of a group makes a
difference in the violence levels today by playing a role in the afterlives of its members and their
dispersal through society. This research would add a new element to the literature of control for
pro-government militias while simultaneously providing answers to some of the questions posed.
By examining whether the groups are funded from a single central source or from multiple sources
and linking this funding to how much control the government has over these groups we add another
explanation to why the informal groups are so much harder to control than the semi-official groups.
This explanation of multiple sources of funding for these militias coincides with the explanation
that informal militias generally have secret agendas that may not align with that of the government
that they support. This would also provide an explanation for the seemingly inexplicable after life
of these groups. Their survival may depend on subsidies from other institutions such as political
parties and domestic or foreign governments (Carey and Mitchell 2017). When the government
they are in support of no longer holds power nor funding, the informal groups can continue to exist
and operate with the funding of other sources along with new objectives that may lead to violence.
While this behavior has an increased likelihood for informal militias, it is possible that semiofficial militias exhibit it as well. It is also possible that informal militias, although more
susceptible to this behavior, may not exhibit it at all. This leads me to form my first hypothesis;
14

that pro-government militias that are formed and controlled by a single government will survive
for a shorter duration than pro-government militias that are created and controlled by multiple
sources. My second hypothesis is that countries with more pro-government militias not controlled
solely by the government will be more violent today. My research aims to explore these
possibilities and make connections to countries current levels of violence. It also aims at exploring
other questions and possibilities such as whether the informal or semi-official status of a group
matters when they are receiving funding from other sources. By examining the militias sources of
funding rather than solely focusing on their relationship with the government, a clearer connection
can be made to the actions and survival of these groups after the government dissipates.
The varying levels of violence experienced by countries can be attributed to the varying
level of control each country had over these pro-government militias. When militias were solely
controlled and held more accountable by a country’s government, these countries experienced less
violence after the governments and groups officially dissipated. When militias had multiple
sources of control besides a country’s government and were held loosely accountable, these
countries experienced more violence after the governments and groups officially dissipated. These
sources of control include foreign governments, political leaders, churches, or even illicit
organizations such as gangs or cartels. A pro-government militia is more likely to have multiple
sources of control when it is has an informal relationship with the government compared to one
that has a semi-official one as there are no official links or loyalties. This relationship also has
implications for the afterlife, or post-regime fate, of the group. I expect that groups with multiple
sources of control will see its members disperse into society with loyalties and employment still
intact to these other sources once the military government is no longer in power. I believe this
15

dispersal and post-regime employment is a key factor in the violence we see today. Meanwhile I
expect that groups only being controlled by the military government will see its members quietly
disperse into society. As loyalties to the regime are no longer justified once that regime no longer
officially exists, less post-regime violence will be exhibited by these members. This assertion dives
deeper into the literature of pro-government militias. It encompasses the militias status with the
government and society, its likelihood of goal variance, the varying levels of control, what effects
the afterlives of these militias, the effect military rule had on these groups, and whether these
variables come together to influence violence today. The findings from this research will
contribute a new explanation in the literature of control on what exactly affects the afterlives of
the pro government militias themselves and how they subsequently affect the civilian population.
It will also contribute a method of analysis for predicting whether these militias will exhibit violent
behavior in other countries after regime change.
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ANALYSIS
In conducting the analysis for my research, I decided to employ a qualitative comparison between
two countries. To evaluate my hypothesis, I will be looking at former military regimes, and the
pro-government militias that they used to stay in power. I will be looking at two case studies, both
of which were military regimes that used pro-government militias, but which experience very
different levels of violence today. The countries that I chose to be case studies are Argentina and
El Salvador. I chose these cases because of the contrasting realities that these countries experience
today. Argentina experiences relatively low violence today whereas El Salvador experiences
relatively high violence, this is despite both countries employing and experiencing similar histories
of violence with pro government militias and military regimes. I will be closely evaluating the
violence perpetrated by the pro-government militias in these countries, committed on behalf of the
government. To measure the violence level, I will analyze country murder rate data for my cases
from the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime. In addition, I will be closely examining and
researching whether these pro-government militias had outside sources of funding or were in
pursuit of alternative goals that did not coincide with that of their governments. Using the most
similar cases method for the countries I chose; I will compare not only the afterlives of the groups
in question but also the groups’ actions during their employment with the government.
Specifically, I will examine whether the groups only acted to achieve goals aligned with that of
the governments’, or if they acted to pursue their own goals as well. I will examine the link between
pro-government militias and government in these cases and gather more information on the acts
and afterlives of these groups. After determining these variables, I will examine these militias
relations to military regimes and the effects that the military regimes had on these groups. I expect
17

that countries with pro-government militias whose goals are not only aligned with the governments
will experience more post-regime violence compared to those whose goals are only aligned with
the governments.
I chose Argentina and El Salvador as case studies because of their similar history yet
contrasting reality today. While El Salvador is one of the most violent countries in the world with
an average homicide rate of 56.79 homicides per 100,000 people, Argentina’s average homicide
rate is 7.02 (UNODC 2015). This sharp contrast is puzzling due to their similar internal historical
conditions. Both cases had military governments spanning the late 1970s to the early 1980s
(Geddes et al. 2014). The governments in each case also employed informal pro-government
militias, that is, these militias had no formally established link to the government. Although all
these variables are similar, the effects that they had on each country are different, this can be seen
via the plot for each country’s homicide rates below spanning from 1993-2017.

Figure 1: Country Homicide Rates for Argentina and El Salvador 1993-2017
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It can be argued that other factors exist that affect this variation in violence we see today.
Such factors are El Salvador’s role in the drug trade, the trans-national war that was taking place
during the same time period, the influence of foreign governments in counterinsurgency training
as well as institutional variation in the democratization in both countries. While these factors may
have had partial effects on the level of violence we see today; I believe that the military
governments use of pro-government militias had a more profound role in the dispersal of violence
throughout society once these regimes fell. I argue that this drastic variation can be partially
attributed to the level of control that each government had on their respective militias as well as
the fate of the militias and their member after the dictatorships fell. In Argentina, when the military
junta was established in 1976, multiple death squads known as “working groups” were set up by
the government to wipe out opposition (Schneider 2000). This was done under the guise of
restoring order and eliminating violence from the Argentine state, which had recently seen leftist
guerillas fighting right-wing militias. Once the military junta was established, the military had
complete control over the society which had longed for peace, and in doing so allowed the junta
the power to take any military actions which it deemed necessary for national security (Schneider
2000). This included the forced disappearances and deaths of opposition. While this progovernment militia was an informal one, because it had no official or formal ties to the government
made public, it only had one source of control. The military regime was the single source of control
for these working groups, as they consisted of police, military personnel and right-wing death
squads (Carey et al. 2013). This case is unique in that while it only has a single source of control
and violence levels in the country are relatively low today, it runs counter to the argument that
militarized police forces lead to violence after military regimes democratize (Frantz 2018). This
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leads me to believe there is another factor influencing the behavior of these groups after the regime
that supports them changes. One assumption I make between the cases that explains the difference
in violence today is the nature of each military regime. While Argentina had a complete military
junta that controlled all aspects of politics and repression; El Salvador had a civilian-military
government that received exorbitant amounts of funding from the U.S. This may have created a
new dynamic for orders between the government and its institutions and militias where goals
varied for the government itself.
The pro-government militias in El Salvador are a direct contrast to those in Argentina. The
militias that began in El Salvador were developed as solutions to subversion in the country. These
death squads were the results of meetings between Central American ministers of the interior, the
U.S. State Department and assistance from the CIA and other U.S. institutions (Sanford 2003).
Aiding in the fight against communism, the Reagan Administration drew a theoretical line in El
Salvador where Communism would not cross eventually forming policy to strengthen armies
across the region which led to cooperation among the military regimes in power in El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras. This line became the backbone for these countries to violently repress
leftist movements. During this time, El Salvador’s military, death squads and civil defense forces
were responsible for 95% of human rights violations found during the U.S. backed war (Sanford
2003). In recruiting for these groups, costs were kept down by recruiting based on political
dispositions. This recruitment method would have allowed opportunists and extremists to join with
relative ease. As an informal group with funding and support from both a foreign and local
government, there is a higher likelihood of goal variance at both the agency level of delegation as
well as the internal level of delegation. At the agency level, the U.S. was backing the Salvadoran
20

government to fight a war against leftist insurgents. Simultaneously, the Salvadoran government
was delegating security tasks to death squads and paramilitaries that were created explicitly for
counterinsurgency (Sanford 2003). These counterinsurgency forces would then delegate tasks
internally among members. At this point it would be difficult to pin-point the principal and the
agent for human rights abuses committed as individuals could be acting on behalf of the
government or for personal gain. There are also accounts of private and semi-official groups acting
independently and joining with other squads (Betancur et al. 1993). This highlights the complexity
of one of the many issues with delegating security tasks to informal pro-government militias. In
addition, there was covert funding from the U.S. government for upwards of $200 million (Sanford
2003). The variables of El Salvador’s history with pro-government militias correlates with the
violence after regime change. It also coincides with the literature on informal pro-government
militias likelihood of high goal variance, and low ability to be controlled by the government. Since
the groups have been officially disbanded, there are still reports that these death squads still operate
within the country with members including civilian and military officials (Betancur et al, 1993).
This still leaves questions as to how these groups survive after regime transitions, especially
democratization. One assumption is that because of the covert and informal nature of these groups,
many officials who were in charge were not known and cannot be convicted of any crimes and
thus transition to the next government and continue operating for personal gain.
CASE S TUDY: ARGENTINA
Argentina’s two main pro-government militias were the Argentine Anticommunist Alliance
(AAA) and military Battalion 601. The Argentine Anticommunist Alliance (Triple A) was used as
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banner in which death squads organized under. Death squads under this alliance were coordinated
by the federal police (Schneider 2000). At the time, Lopez Rega, headed the Triple A, the ministry
of social welfare and Argentina’s security forces. The Triple A operated with his tacit consent to
step up repression tactics in 1975 (Pion-berlin 1983). Many police officers and members of the
military were lined to the Triple A yet because of amnesty laws many retained their positions and
often sought promotions or continued operating in paramilitaries. This is seen in a wave of antiSemitic attacks that occurred in the early 1990’s which were linked to paramilitary bases and
operatives who previously served as army intelligence officers (McSherry 1997). Some of the
greatest revelations of the afterlives of this group were during the transition to democracy where
political intelligence operations and autonomous “mafias” survived the fall of the military junta.
There are numerous intelligence agencies that operate within the military without civilian control
or oversight and thousands of retired military, intelligence and security officers that are employed
by private security companies (McSherry 1997). Many of these officers engaged in dirty war
repression tactics but were pardoned due to laws created during the tenures of Alfonsin and
Menem. Many of these laws were created to pardon most of the security forces whose participation
in the dirty war was limited; and to punish the more notorious offenders and those in charge.
However, this law allowed many to slip through the cracks. According to government sources,
active duty officers who were active during the dirty war were linked to private security agencies
with links to the government (McSherry 1997). The military was as heavily involved in the dirty
war as the Triple A, retired navy officer Adolfo Scilingo publicly admitted participating in the
dirty war and implicated many of the admirals in the navy had not only participated but been
promoted as well (McSherry 1997). In his account he detailed missions in which the military would
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strip prisoners and throw them off planes into the Atlantic Ocean (Hodges 1991). The most
common form of participation was kidnapping and torturing which became known as the “sucking
up” process. This process targeted subversives which were then kidnapped along with anyone
close to them at the time of their abduction, even if they had no relation to subversive groups, the
slightest hint of affiliation resulted in being sucked up. This led to the unrelenting torture and death
of many civilians whom were suspected and found guilty by association. This “sucking up” process
was executed by small task forces of heavily armed men from several sources such as the military,
police and criminal entities (Lewis 2002). The military operated with the full support of the federal
police throughout Argentina, most notorious of the police chiefs was General Ramon Camps.
Camps was chief of police and in charge of units covering Buenos Aires, later earning the moniker
“The Butcher of Buenos Aires” he was responsible for the repression in that area from 1976 to
1978 (Hodges 1991). Some of the navy’s first groups were composed of officers, and retired navy
and police personnel who were coordinated through a chief officer who reported directly to
Admiral Massera. In the Army the Third Army Corps and Battalion 601 were primarily responsible
for human rights abuses. The “Comando de Libertadores de America” was a private death squad
who had direct ties to the army’s Third Corps and were responsible for many of the abductions
and torture prior to 1976 (Brennan & Ferreyra 2018). Battalion 601 primarily dealt with the
kidnapping and tortures of suspected subversives. While the actual battalion was composed of
soldiers, the task forces were often comprised of men on loan from the police or intelligence
agencies and headed by army officers. These tasks forces would use former AAA members and
criminals in return for leniency for their sentences (Lewis 2002). The task forces were structured

23

so that everyone had a specific task; some would kidnap, others would torture, and others would
collect and keep records and information (Lewis 2002).
Military Battalion 601was a specialized military intelligence service set up in the late
1970’s and active during the Dirty War and operation condor who disbanded in 2000. This group
was directly under the control of Leopoldo Galtieri, the Leader of the Military Junta. Unclassified
documents show the reporting and command structure of Battalion 601 naming Galtieri as the
commander in chief which they report to (The National Security Archive 1980). The officer who
presided over Battalion 601 was Colonel Mucio. Although he did not rule them, his position was
to make decisions yet is said to have found it difficult, resulting in his subordinates operating with
more freedom over their own actions leaving Mucio to just accept their actions and decisions (The
National Security Archive 1980). This freedom was not limited to Mucio but is a result of how the
chain of command was structured. The chain of command for the military Junta was vested
between the air force, navy, and army; all of which operated in different regions and coordinated
with local police. This structure spanned the entire country the units who oversaw these regions
gave subunits responsibility for security zones, and these subunits gave further and more
centralized authority to sub-subunits. Each commanding officer of a security zone determined how
to root out subversion and had much discretion in doing so (Lewis 2002). This decentralization
and autonomy gave power to junior officers and their subordinates who no one could tell whose
instructions they were operating under. During the peak years of 1975-1978 the policy of the
armed forces was to ensure that most of the officer corps participated in anti-subversive operations.
This was to prevent the emergence of an elite body of soldiers with combat experience and to
compromise the entire institution in the methods that the leadership recognized may be questioned
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(The National Security Archive 1984). There would be no goal variance with this battalion, as
their orders would be given by the head of government Galtieri, however because of poor oversight
the soldiers were free to complete their orders to any extent with which they deemed necessary
which may have led to more casualties. After the fall of Galtieri’s regime, Raul Alfonsin took
control as the first democratically elected president who now had to reconcile the relationship with
the military incorporating them into their standard security role and prevent any more coups from
happening. Alfonsin avoided disenfranchising the military through limiting the budget cuts facing
the military, reorganizing its structure and punishing only the most corrupt and egregious violators
of human rights throughout the past regime (The National Security Archive 1984). This included
Battalion 601 which was disbanded in 2000. These compromises allowed for the military to begin
the process of slowly falling under civilian control again. By only punishing the most corrupt
human rights violators, the government allowed for most officers and personnel to remain in
employment if their roles were minimal; avoiding the catastrophe of mass retirements and
disenfranchisement of highly trained soldiers. This punishment was a result of a lengthy set of
trials of the former Junta generals, admirals, and air force brigadiers responsible. All three branches
of the military; Army, Navy and Air Force, had been implicated in the dirty war. Each having
colluded with pro-government militias to root out subversion; each having to account for criminal
behavior (Hodges 1991).
Both pro-government militias were primarily composed of members from various security
or intelligence apparatuses acting on their own discretion from orders from high ranking members
of the military juntas. The perpetrators of violence were the three branches of the military, the
police, union thugs, and paramilitary organizations with clandestine links to the government.
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Namely pro-government militias such as death squads operating under minister Jose Lopez Rega
and the AAA (Brennan & Ferreyra 2018). This was confirmed when of 159 alleged members of
the Triple A, 66 were proven to be members of the Argentine security apparatus. Of those 66, 5
continued in the armed forces, 43 in the police, and 4 went to work for security forces (Moyano
1995). After the democratic governments of Alfonsin and Menem tried to retain most of the
military and only punish those members heavily involved in the dirty war, many officers either
stayed in the military or retired and joined private security apparatuses. Those private security
apparatuses retained substantial links with the government. Officers and members who stayed in
the military and police forces eventually rose through the ranks to higher positions. We see
decreased levels in violence today due to these PGM’s being officially disbanded and because
most of the officers involved in the dirty war were loyal to the military and their superiors rather
than the regime itself. Those who stayed in the military and security forces did so to continue their
support, those who left to join private security forces continue to do such work as well. With
military and civilian government relations improving throughout the years we have seen a decrease
in “subversive” elements within society, decreasing the need for mobilization of these forces.
CASE S TUDY: EL SALVADOR
During the 1980’s there were at least 8 paramilitary death squads that operated at once with an
estimated 80,000 supporters (Mazzei 2009). The pro-government militias in El Salvador were
organized under two categories. The first being the Civil Defense Patrols and the second being
Death Squads that operated under military control. After the 1979 coup the paramilitary death
squads of the military, including the various security services - The National Guard, Treasury
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Police and National Police - remained intact under the control of high-level officials in the
Civilian-military Junta's army and continued to target leftist sympathizers and civilians during the
civil war (Carey and Mitchell 2014). The Civil Defense Patrols were Village based civil patrols
were set up by the Salvadorian army to inform on guerrilla movements in the countryside during
the civil war from 1980-1992. Civilians were recruited and sometimes armed by the military. Many
had been former members of Orden, a paramilitary network disbanded after the 1979 coup that
brought the civil-military junta to power (Carey and Mitchell 2014). ORDEN (National
Democratic Organization) was a rural paramilitary force that based its framework for most of the
death squads in El Salvador and operated on the doctrine of interpenetration and close control of
the system by the regular army (Sanford 2003). It essentially was a nationwide network of
informants that acted like a spider web to stop subversives. At the lowest level’s peasants acted as
grass root informants to the military who would then pass information up to their superiors and act
against subversives (Mazzei 2009). ORDEN quickly became a powerful organization and evolved
into the backbone of the country’s death squads. Even though there were no laws, regulations, or
paper trails about the creation of ORDEN, the official chain of command linked the organization
to the state, specifically the president (Mazzei 2009). For the death squads and paramilitaries,
cooperation was not an issue as there was membership overlap between the military and these
groups and was the most common feature. So common that these groups were primarily military
personnel working off duty or illegally, and so well known that the president in 1984 called for the
registration of several senior officers (Mazzei 2009). It was concluded that death squad personnel
overlapped within the military as well as across various other security services such as the national
police, treasury police and civilian patrols and that they operated in plain clothes under the orders
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of superior officers (Mazzei 2009). They all fell under the military and even though they didn’t
have one central leader, they were all directed and connected by the military connections they had.
These death squads were not the only means for repression by the government, they also used
immediate reaction battalions, most notoriously, the Atlacatl Battalion. These battalions were
created in 1981 and trained by US advisors, they were specialized in anti-guerilla warfare and were
responsible for some of the worst violence against civilians including the El Mozote massacre.
Death squads were and still are prevalent in Salvadorian society. They can be traced back
to the wealthy land owners who hired private militias to protect their haciendas. Even prior to the
military government in El Salvador the government and military were already being converged.
Prior to the consolidation of the armed forces by the state, a national police force had already been
formed to protect the domains of large landowners responsible for agricultural exports (Kincaid
2000). In the 1940’s the national police force had been transferred to the military controlled
defense ministries, putting military officers in senior positions of the police (Kincaid 2000). It was
not until later that a national guard was established (Mazzei 2009). However even after they were
established, civic patrols were created which were comprised of citizens instead of military officers
and were unrestrained when it came to protection. These civic patrols and private militias have
historical roots in El Salvador, with the strong relationships to landowners being just one group
that had control over them; so much so that many times national guard posts were set up on private
haciendas (Mazzei 2009). While currently ORDEN has been disbanded, the structure remained
intact and its personnel simply integrated into other security units that became army-run militias
that provided local security to villages (Campbell and Brenner 2000). Currently these death squads
operate for pay, as a new market has emerged for private security (Kincaid 2000). This private
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security is where a majority of disenfranchised military and police have ended up after the military
and police purge that occurred after the peace agreements were signed (Call 2003).
The doctrine of repression by the Junta in El Salvador was very similar to that of Argentina,
whose goal was to root out subversives by any means and rely on repression as a means of control
for the population (Mason and Krane 1989). Like Argentina’s Trial of the Junta’s, Salvadoran
Trials took place, specifically carried out by the UN Human Rights Commission on the Truth. The
commission recommended the dismissal of those who were in positions of authority such as
military officers, public officials, and judges that were specifically named (Ensalaco 1994). This
commission estimated that the military and paramilitary death squads were responsible for 95
percent of the human rights abuses committed between 1980 and 1992 (Call 2003). With these
findings, the report also publicly announced the names of those it found to participated in these
abuses, effectively ending their careers (Call 2003). Most changes occurred after the peace
agreements in 1992. These changes saw a transformation of the doctrine for the military which
was now to respect human rights and subordination to civilian authority. In addition, numerous
security forces were dissolved such as the National Guard and National Police as well as the
disbandment of the Immediate reaction Battalions and civil defense patrols. The largest change
was the reduction of the size of the armed forces from 63,000 to 31,000 (Kincaid 2000). While El
Salvador has succeeded in eliminating the military from its police forces, another problem has
been created. A privatization has occurred in the realm of security, a security market has been
created where varying degrees of security can be purchased (Kincaid 2000). Loosely regulated
private security firms saw a rise in number from less than ten in 1992, to over 250 in 2001
exhibiting a similar skyrocket in the number of agents working for these companies (Call 2003).
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This new market has been attributed to multiple factors including the widespread circulation of
black-market military arms, as well as the demobilization of combatants with few good job
prospects (Kincaid 2000). This market as well as the demobilization provide a very different
scenario to that of Argentina where most who participated in the Dirty War and human rights
abuses either were afforded to remain in their positions in the military or find other job prospects.
The violence we see today in El Salvador can be attributed to the existence of these progovernment militias that received foreign training in anti-guerilla tactics yet had multiple political
and financial backers. Most of these pro-government militias were financed by right wing civilians
as well as those who owned land as private security (Campbell and Brenner 2000). After the peace
agreement was reached ending the civil war, reforms were made and about half of the military was
purged. The disenfranchisement of these soldiers along with El Salvador’s history of private
security provided the conditions for a security market to flourish where the same soldiers who
were in the military and participated in the civil war are now for hire by entities who are willing
to pay them for protection whether it be the land owning elite, the government, or foreign interests
such as drug cartels and gangs.
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CONCLUSION
Exploring the wide variation in violence we see today in Latin America, my research sought to
uncover a potentially causal link between the level of control that military regimes in these
countries had over pro-government militias and current levels of societal violence. I primarily
examined the relationship between the government and these groups determining whether there
was an informal or semi-official link. I believed that governments that held more control over their
pro-government militias saw less post-regime violence than governments who held less control.
With the level of control as the main variable in focus, I also examined the constitution of these
groups as well as their afterlives.
I chose Argentina and El Salvador as my case studies as they were a representative sample
of the variation in violence we currently see in Latin America, while retaining similar
characteristics in their military governments use of PGMs as repressive tools in society. There
were many similarities in the constitutions of these groups in both countries as well as the
relationships they had with their governments. Group in both cases contained active members of
the security forces as well as known criminal entities, in both cases most of the commands came
from governmental entities and institutions and both cases saw much of their security apparatus
implicated in human rights abuses. Where the cases begin to differ is in the level of control the
governments had over these groups, specifically, whose orders they took and where the groups
goals were aligned. In Argentina, all the orders came from commanding officers in the military or
from governmental institutions, aligning the groups goals directly with that of the governments. In
El Salvador, orders came from commanding officers in the military, but some groups also received
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orders from private interests such as large landowners who held previous relationships with many
members of these pro-government militias. This overlap between members taking orders from
both private interests and the government diminished the level of control the government had over
these groups. While this dynamic may have affected the levels of violence seen during the military
regimes control, it is unlikely that it affected post-regime violence as I originally believed. To
accurately assess these groups effect on post-regime violence, more detailed information is needed
on the members post-regime activities once operations under their pro-government militias were
officially terminated.
Ultimately, the results of my case studies did not uncover a causal link. It did, however,
generate new insight on other potential variables that had previously been overlooked. Namely the
severity of punishment that was dealt to the former military regimes during their respective postwar trials and the post-regime fates of these pro-government militias and their members. I believe
future research exploring these areas may benefit the literature of pro-government militias and the
literature on state and individual punishment in response to human rights abuses; determining the
possible effect these variables may have on post regime dispersal of violence throughout society.
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